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CHAPTER NINE 
 
 
DYING TO GO TO COURT: DEMANDING A LEGAL 
REMEDY TO END-OF-LIFE UNCERTAINTY 
 
Naomi Richards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Voluntary euthanasia, or the ‘right-to-die’, as it is currently termed, is 
one of the most visible and divisive bioethical issues to be routinely 
debated in medically advanced countries. Central to the issue is the 
conflict between the rights of individuals to determine their own lives 
and, by extension, the ending of that life, and the duty of the state to 
protect the lives of its most vulnerable citizens. For some, the medical 
hastening of death by way of a deliberate intervention is the next step 
in a trend which has seen technological advances in medicine turn death 
into something which can now be orchestrated, negotiated and timed 
(turning off a ventilator, deciding not to treat, etc.). For others, this is a 
step too far and must be resisted at all costs. As attempts to legalise and 
institutionalise the practice of euthanasia have increased over the last 
century, it is no longer considered a private matter between doctor and 
patient but rather has become a matter of public concern where the 
language of rights now dominates. In the UK, the primary focus for this 
dramatic conflict of rights is the courtroom. Legal redress is sought, as 
individuals living with serious progressive illness lose confidence in the 
medical profession to sufficiently ease their suffering as their body 
deteriorates and their capacities lessen. Not only is the law valued for 
the potential remedy it provides, but a favourable judgement also offers 
some formal validation of a particular ethical position. In recent years, 
the courts have become the most productive (and provocative) forum 
for shifting the terms of the debate and applying pressure on British 
lawmakers. 
This chapter focuses on a high-profile legal challenge which was 
mounted in the UK in 2008 and was finally determined by judges in the 
country’s supreme court in 2010. The case involved a woman named 
Debbie Purdy and her husband Omar Puente. Debbie had been living 
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with multiple sclerosis, an incurable and degenerative disease, since 
1995. The couple wanted to challenge the possible application of the 
criminal law in cases where individuals have asked their relatives to aid 
them in travelling abroad to a jurisdiction where they may lawfully be 
helped to die. Since 2002, a number of Britons have travelled to 
Switzerland, where right-to-die organisations can legally assist in their 
suicide in accordance with a unique provision in its 1942 law allowing 
anyone to assist in a suicide for altruistic reasons. In the UK, the Suicide 
Act 1961,1explicitly states that it is illegal to encourage or assist the 
suicide or attempted suicide of another person and that the offence is 
punishable by up to 14 years in prison. Debbie’s was an appeal to the 
judicial process to help her clarify the risks to her husband of a future 
decision to end her life abroad. In lieu of a medical remedy for her 
disease, Debbie sought out a legal remedy in terms of knowledge about 
the likelihood of her husband being prosecuted, should she ask him to 
accompany her to Switzerland at some unspecified future time. 
The principal outcome of the case has been the publication, in 
2010, of a policy statement which, for the first time, puts into written 
and public form reasons why the decision might be taken not to 
prosecute a person for helping another to die. This chapter discusses the 
development of this new policy document, and the moral reckoning 
which determined its final form. Although the chapter focuses on the 
specifics of Debbie’s case and its outcome, it also extrapolates from 
those specifics to comment on the broader cultural context in which 
assisted suicide is undoubtedly gaining social acceptance. The central 
focus of the chapter is the way in which the law was used instrumentally 
by campaigners to bring about a policy which has changed the way 
assisting someone to die is regulated. As other chapters in this volume 
relate, the technicalities of the law might on the face of it appear quite 
alienating for ordinary citizens who are seeking redress for a perceived 
injustice. However, in the case put forward here, it was the 
technicalities of the law which were debated and wrangled over in lieu 
of any political or medical consensus about the moral or ethical 
rightness of assisting people to die. It was these technicalities which 
were used as an instrument to extract a significant concession from the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), forcing him to devise a new 
policy document. Some may view this as an example of the law 
overstepping its boundaries, changing policy where it should rightly be 
left up to those democratically elected to do so. Others argue that the 
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law is simply too blunt an instrument to tackle the delicate ethical 
dilemmas which arise around end-of-life decisions. However, in this 
case, the law was productive. It produced an outcome which, on the face 
of it, may appear only as yet another regulatory instrument, but 
concealed within that is what is perceived as a validation of the 
demands of right-to-die campaigners, and the opening up of further 
opportunities for applying legal as well as political pressure on 
politicians to change the law in a more definitive way. 
 This chapter is based on data gained from anthropological research 
conducted from 2007 to 2009, as Debbie Purdy’s case journeyed 
through the British courts. The overall aim of the research was to trace 
and contextualise the values, beliefs and convictions of both sides in the 
right-to-die debate. The research conducted was multisited and 
involved following the ‘chains, paths, threads, conjunctions, locations’ 
(Marcus, 1998: 90) where the terms of the debate were decided. I 
interviewed Debbie Purdy at length early in 2008 before her application 
for Judicial Review was heard and before media attention turned her 
into a recognisable public figure. I was present at her Court of Appeal 
hearing in February 2009 and interviewed her again over the phone 
afterwards. I also spent a week working for her lawyer collating 
information collected through questionnaires sent to the relatives of 
people who had died at Dignitas. I formally interviewed the Human 
Rights Officer of the campaigning organisation Dignity in Dying which 
supported her case and had other informal contact with the Chief 
Executive, the Head of Legal Strategy and Policy and the Director of 
Campaigns and Communications at two AGMs and various public 
events and conferences. In addition, the larger research project led me 
to interview a wide array of campaigners lobbying both for and against 
legalised assistance to die, along with other people who were planning 
to travel to Switzerland for help to die. This knowledge informs my 
approach and helps me to ground the outcome of the case in the wider 
political context. 
 
 
DEBBIE PURDY’S PREDICAMENT 
 
If I could write the future, we would clarify the law as it stands, change the law in 
the next couple of years, and in the meantime someone would find a cure for 
primary-progressive MS.  
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(Debbie Purdy writing in her 2010 autobiography: 280). 
 
 Debbie Purdy was diagnosed with primary progressive multiple 
sclerosis (MS) in 1995, when she was just 32, although it is likely that 
she was experiencing the symptoms of the disease for years before that. 
MS is the most common disabling neurological disease affecting young 
adults. It affects about 100 000 people in the UK.2 Symptoms include, 
among others: loss of sensitivity and muscle weakness/spasms leading 
to mobility difficulties; problems with coordination and balance; 
fatigue and acute and chronic pain; and difficulties with speech and 
swallowing. Debbie has a progressive form of the disease and there is 
no known cure or remedy. Shortly after diagnosis she asked her doctor 
what she could expect and he replied: ‘the only thing I can tell you is 
that it’s not going to get any better. And that’s pretty much it’ (Purdy 
2010: 36). However, Debbie is not ‘dying’. She has lived with her 
disease for a long time now, and although her symptoms steadily 
increase, she may live with it for many years to come. In fact, people 
with MS have a life expectancy which is only five to ten years lower 
than that of the unaffected population (Compston and Coles 2008). 
Even if her life were to be considerably foreshortened, it is not this 
which she fears so much as the prospect of future ‘unbearable’ 3 
suffering which may cause her to feel that her life is no longer worth 
living. It is at this point that Debbie would like the option of hastening 
her own death. Ideally, she would like to be assisted to die in the UK 
with the help of a doctor. However, in lieu of a change in the law which 
would allow this to happen, the most likely place for her to want to 
hasten her own death would be Zurich, Switzerland, with the help of 
the organisation, Dignitas. 
 Dignitas, founded in 1998, is one of three Swiss organisations 
which help foreign nationals to die. However, Dignitas is the only one 
to have repeatedly made tabloid headlines in the UK, the majority of 
which have portrayed its activities in a very negative light (cf. Hall 
2009; Weathers 2011). The organisation operates strictly within Swiss 
law, which states that people who assist in a suicide can only be 
prosecuted if they are motivated by self-interest. As such, the fees 
which Dignitas charge people only cover its operating costs and no 
profit is made. A retired doctor initially meets and assesses the 
individual wishing to die and, if they are satisfied that the various 
conditions are met, they then write the lethal prescription. The 
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prescription is then collected by a Dignitas volunteer who prepares the 
drug and gives it to the individual to self-administer. The death ‘event’ 
itself is therefore de-medicalised, and I will return to this concept later 
in the chapter. When cases of Britons being assisted to die at Dignitas 
have been reported in the British press, it is often referred to as a 
‘clinic’. However, the setting is intentionally non-clinical and there is 
no medical professional present when the lethal liquid is taken. On the 
day of Debbie Purdy’s appeal hearing in February 2009, Dignitas 
released the information that 100 Britons had died there since 2002. In 
January 2012, this figure had increased to 182 Britons (Beckford 2012). 
 The context in which Debbie’s case arose is one where notions of 
the ‘good death’ are slowly changing. Cross-culturally, the ‘good death’ 
has been identified as one where there is some degree of control over 
the arbitrariness of physiological deterioration (Bloch and Parry 1999: 
12) and where death comes at the end of a long and successful life, at 
home and without violence or pain (Seale and van der Geest 2004: 885). 
While these attributes continue to hold in the UK, the point of cleavage 
has become whether the good death must be a natural death or whether 
it can be artificially procured. Palliative care philosophy, which 
occupies the mainstream in terms of an ideal-type model of end of life 
care, has much in common with right-to-die philosophy in that both 
seek to personalise and individualise dying and both emphasise that 
choice and control should reside with the dying person herself (Walter 
1994). However, where the two movements differ is that palliative care 
philosophy takes the position that it seeks neither to hasten nor to 
postpone death (Maddocks 1996). Right-to-die philosophy, on the other 
hand, takes the view that for some, natural death can cause such a 
profound loss of control over the physical boundaries of the body, as 
Lawton (2000: 7) documents in her ethnography ‘The Dying Process’, 
that they can experience a diminishment of self. It is in such situations, 
advocates argue, that only by artificially hastening a person’s death can 
social and biological death be realigned, and a person’s suffering be 
brought to an end. It is an uncontrolled natural death which Debbie 
Purdy fears awaits her, and it is this which inspired her to take up her 
legal challenge to make viable her option of an artificial death abroad. 
 When I interviewed Debbie, she told me that she characterises 
herself as a ‘loud-mouthed, obnoxious’ pro-choice activist: ‘I’m not the 
type of person to just drift into the background’. She sat on the board of 
Dignity in Dying, the UK’s main organisation campaigning for the 
219 
 
legalisation of assisted dying,4 for a number of years before stepping 
down in 2007 to begin her legal challenge. For some time she has 
worked as a ‘simulated patient’ for a medical school, a project that aims 
to educate doctors about how to engage appropriately with disabled 
patients. She thinks that disabled people should have the same access 
to services as everyone else, but she also thinks that disabled people 
should be allowed to decide what they want for themselves, even if that 
deviates from what is expected of them. She doesn’t support the 
paternalism she encounters in the disability rights movement and 
resents being called ‘vulnerable’. As she told me: ‘If you are going to 
argue for disabled rights, then you have to argue for their right to decide 
what they want. It’s easy to say you support free speech with someone 
who is agreeing with you.’ 
By this rationale, Debbie Purdy feels strongly that disabled people 
should be able to choose an assisted death, without needing to be 
‘protected from ourselves’. This is why she launched her case in 2007 
with the help of Dignity in Dying which arranged her legal 
representation and her media appearances. 
 Assisted suicide first entered Debbie’s consciousness through the 
media coverage of Dianne Pretty’s legal case six years earlier. In 2001, 
Dianne petitioned the courts to allow her husband to help her commit 
suicide with legal immunity (meaning he would not be charged for 
committing a crime after her death). It was never specified how or 
where her suicide would take place. Dianne was living with motor 
neurone disease and was paralysed from the neck down, making it very 
difficult for her to take her own life. Dianne took her case to the House 
of Lords and then to the European Court of Human Rights, where it was 
finally dismissed. When Dianne heard that she had lost her case, she 
declared that ‘the law has taken away my human rights’. This comment 
highlights the way in which the language of human rights is often used 
rhetorically to register disapproval of state law. Its appeal rests in 
maintaining a critical distance from the law, and its ability therefore to 
stretch the boundaries and limits of the law (Douzinas 2000: 344). 
Dianne’s case was the first to frame requests for help to die as a ‘human 
right’ in an attempt to do just that: stretch the limit of the law and give 
a desire for a certain type of death transcendent value (Douzinas 2000: 
367). 
 Dianne’s case, like Debbie’s, was supported by Dignity in Dying 
(at that time called the Voluntary Euthanasia Society) and marked a new 
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phase in the campaigning strategy of the organisation. The impetus now 
appears to be to highlight the suffering of specific individuals with 
whom the public can identify, in order to promote its cause. These 
individuals become ‘spectacles of suffering’ so that ‘whether or not 
anyone speaks to his or her suffering, an observer is likely to understand 
and acknowledge that suffering is taking place’ (Williams 2007: 137). 
At the same time, the courts have been viewed instrumentally as a 
potentially more expedient route to success when compared to the more 
cumbersome parliamentary process. It was Dianne Pretty’s high profile 
appeal that raised public awareness of assisted dying in Britain and 
paved the way for Debbie Purdy subsequently to bring her own legal 
challenge. 
 Debbie’s case was this. If, at an unspecified future date, she feels 
compelled to travel to Switzerland for help to die because her MS has 
advanced to a stage where she no longer feels her life is worth living 
and she determines of her own accord that she is suffering ‘unbearably’, 
she may need to ask her husband, Omar Puente, to accompany her and 
assist her with the journey. If he were to agree, there is a possibility that 
he would be prosecuted under Section 2(1) of the 1961 Suicide Act 
which makes it illegal to encourage or assist in the suicide or attempted 
suicide of another person.5 Debbie was not seeking immunity for Omar, 
as in the Pretty case where Dianne sought immunity for her husband. 
Rather, Debbie was asking for the DPP, at whose discretion a criminal 
case against Omar would be brought, to clarify exactly what counts as 
‘assistance’ and what factors he would be likely to take into account 
when deciding whether or not to prosecute him. Her lawyers claimed 
that Article 86 – the right to respect for private and family life – of the 
European Convention on Human Rights was engaged in Debbie’s 
decision to want to take her own life, and that the state was only entitled 
to interfere with this right ‘such as in accordance with the law’ (ECHR, 
Article 8(2)). In order that individuals like Debbie and Omar know in 
advance what is ‘in accordance with the law’, it was argued by her team 
that there needed to be a clear statement of policy outlining the factors 
tending for and against a prosecution. Debbie said that if she was not 
100% certain that Omar would not be prosecuted after her death, then 
she would not allow him to accompany her. As she told me: ‘I’ve got 
to be certain that my decision will not hurt him.’ Her argument was that 
in lieu of a clear prosecutorial policy she would be forced to travel to 
Switzerland and die earlier than she wanted to while she still had the 
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physical capacity to travel alone. For this reason, Debbie always framed 
her claim not as a ‘right-to-die’ but as a ‘right-to-live longer’. This 
sentiment is similarly reflected in the title of her autobiography: ‘It’s 
not because I want to die’. 
What was intriguing about Debbie’s case was that although it was her 
campaigning efforts that brought the legal challenge in the first instance 
and it was her future death decision which was the focus, it was her 
husband’s potential actions that were the subject of the legal dispute. 
This actually mirrors Dianne Pretty’s case in which it was Dianne’s 
husband, Brian, whose potential actions were being judged. Debbie’s 
husband Omar is the one who risks prosecution for helping her to make 
the journey to Switzerland. However, he has said in many interviews 
with the press that he will go with her regardless of the risks. It is Debbie 
who refuses this offer out of a desire to protect him. They are trying to 
determine the freedom of their future selves. Yet the criminal law 
operates retrospectively and is not anticipatory. It responds to what has 
already happened and the discretion to prosecute cannot be exercised in 
advance. It is not designed to offer certainty in the face of future events 
which have yet to take place. This is the limit to the remedy the law can 
provide. 
 Debbie and Omar are mutually implicated in her death decision. 
Right-to-die rhetoric would have us believe that demands for help to die 
are purely a matter of individual choice and a desire for individual 
control. Advocates argue that such demands are made by individuals 
who want to determine the end to their own lives through their own 
subjective assessment of whether they are suffering ‘unbearably’. As 
Debbie told me: ‘I don’t want to be in other people’s control. I don’t 
want to be at their whim. I want to have complete control and autonomy 
about what I do and how I do it.’ 
 This focus on the individual as the locus of decision-making is 
indicative of a more general reliance on individual autonomy as the 
cornerstone of medical law and ethics (Mason and Laurie 2006: 6). At 
its most pared down, autonomy relies on ‘negative liberty’ or freedom 
from interference, as famously described by Isaiah Berlin (2006 
[1958]). O’Neill (2002: 29) describes autonomy as a ‘capacity’ or ‘trait’ 
which individuals have and which they manifest by acting 
independently. John Stewart Mill (2006[1859]) influentially extended 
the idea beyond independent action to include the enabling of self-
expression or the flourishing of individuality. For some philosophers, 
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this extension too closely aligns the concept with liberal individualism 
which champions the fulfilment of the unimpeded individual, while 
ignoring the impact of that fulfilment on the broader community. After 
all, the social dimension of life requires that individual autonomy be 
qualified by the legitimate interests and expectations of others (Mason 
and Laurie 2006: 5–7). This is what is known as the communitarian 
approach to ethics. 
 In the UK, it was the case of Re C (adult: refusal of medical 
treatment)[1994] that established the legal precedent granting patients 
the right to refuse treatment, including life-sustaining treatment,7 on the 
grounds of self-determination with regard to a person’s own body. The 
legal consequences of unauthorised invasion of that bodily integrity 
include civil actions for damages and criminal liability for assault 
(Mason and Laurie 2006: 349). The right was made unequivocally 
enforceable with the case of Ms B (adult: refusal of medical 
treatment)[2002].8 However, where the law is seen to value individual 
autonomy over and above the obligations we owe to those around us, 
there are concerns that an exaggerated absoluteness and hyper-
individualism can take hold (Glendon 1991: x–xi) which neglects 
people’s unavoidable dependency on others and the fact that an 
individual’s decision has consequences for other people. As Butler 
writes: ‘Although we struggle for rights over our own bodies, the very 
bodies over which we struggle are not quite ever our own’ (Butler 2004: 
26). 
 In demanding a human right to have her private life respected, 
Debbie’s decision depends on her husband and his support. She cannot 
act alone. Despite the fact that it is Debbie who has pursued the case, in 
reality it is he who will feel the effects of the law should he be 
prosecuted for helping her. What becomes clear from reading Debbie’s 
autobiography (2010) is that Omar was always a reluctant passenger in 
her campaign. She writes of his ‘hurt look’ when she talked to 
journalists about the prospect of taking her own life and recalls his 
response when she first asked him if he would come with her to 
Dignitas: ‘Of course I would come, Debbie. I don’t even have to think 
about it. But for now can we not talk about it? Can we just get on with 
enjoying our lives together?’ (Purdy 2010: 232). Omar is intimately 
involved in Debbie’s decisions. He must anticipate her death, not 
because he chooses to, but because Debbie is a determined campaigner 
who has decided to prepare for her death in a very public way. When 
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she says ‘I’ve got to be certain that my decision will not hurt him’, it is 
clear that she conceives of her death decision as hers alone to make, and 
yet she refuses to criminally implicate Omar, indicating the limits to her 
autonomy. As Strathern highlights, ‘To an age that thinks of itself as 
individualistic, the revelation of relationship can come as something of 
a surprise. The person as an individual turns out to be the person as a 
relative’ (Strathern 2005: 10). 
 In the public spectacle which surrounded Debbie’s case in its 
passage through the courts, Omar featured heavily in the extensive press 
coverage. Her autobiography is presented as something of a love story, 
and pictures of the two of them together grace both the front and back 
covers. The strength of their relationship was a fact which implicitly 
strengthened their case in the court as well as in the eyes of the public, 
a point I will expand on later. 
 Another crucial factor in Debbie and Omar’s case, which was 
often overlooked in its reporting, was the many hypothetical 
circumstances at stake. If she finds herself ‘suffering unbearably’ at 
some point in the future, she might want to have an assisted death at 
Dignitas. Perhaps she is anticipating the worst, but she wants to be 
prepared anyway. As she told me: 
I don’t want to make the decision now. Until you are in an unbearable 
situation you don’t really know what is unbearable. When I was twenty-one, 
I thought being in a wheelchair would be the most terrible thing that could 
happen – that I’d kill myself if that ever happened. It’s not that bad. You learn 
to cope in a different way, you learn to see yourself in a different way. You 
are not prevented from being you. 
 
 Debbie does not yet know what degree of bodily deterioration and 
loss of function she can tolerate while still finding life worthwhile. She 
does not know which capacities and activities will, in her eyes, 
represent the essential components of an acceptable life and indeed 
there is no certainty that she will ever have to confront these questions. 
As Lawton’s (2000: 7) ethnographic work shows, in a British cultural 
context, in order for selfhood to be realised and maintained, certain 
specific bodily capacities and attributes must be possessed, namely the 
bodily ability to act as the agent of one’s embodied actions and 
intentions. People who lack this ability can fall out of the category of 
personhood and experience a ‘diminishment of self’. In some respects, 
Debbie’s appeal to the law to provide a remedy for her uncertainty 
stems from her lack of trust in her doctor’s ability to prevent or 
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ameliorate just such a diminishment of self. As philosopher Onora 
O’Neill (2002: 17) emphasises, while an increase in patient autonomy 
(often consumer choice by another name) has challenged the 
asymmetrical relations of knowledge and power which historically 
defined the doctor–patient relationship, transforming the patient from a 
grateful supplicant into a wary consumer, it has also resulted in a loss 
of trust. This has been exacerbated, O’Neill argues, by a culture of 
blame and accusation which is widespread both in the media and in the 
literature of campaigning organisations. A loss of trust in professionals, 
when combined with a pervasive rights rhetoric, results in a culture in 
which, according to O’Neill (2002: 10), ‘incoherent demands’ like a 
‘right to health’ can gain political traction. Given that no human action 
can secure health for all, she argues that there can be no obligation to 
meet that demand. Many who oppose a ‘right to die’ might similarly 
argue that it is an ‘incoherent demand’ because there can be no 
obligation for doctors to bring about the kind of death the individual 
chooses. As Mason and Laurie (2006: 7) stress, the doctor, as the 
administrator of the lethal drugs, is also himself a moral agent and might 
be affected by the task. As already established, Debbie’s rights claims 
stem not only from a loss of trust in her doctors, but also from a sense 
in which she may suffer in a way which is beyond the scope of medicine 
to remedy. Because there is no cure for her bodily deterioration, doctors 
cannot give her confidence in her future. By seeking a ‘right’ to die, she 
is appealing to the law to provide that certainty and to offer the implicit 
recognition that there are certain types of illnesses that can result in 
certain types of suffering and diminishment of self, which medicine 
cannot ameliorate. 
 The unpredictability of the progressive symptoms of her disease 
was causing Debbie ontological insecurity (Giddens 1990; Richards 
and Rotter 2013). As Toombs (1995: 20) points out, for people with 
progressive disability, time may be disturbed in that the future, rather 
than the present, assumes overriding significance. Yet the future also 
becomes inherently problematic because of its unknown aspect. There 
is a lot of uncertainty in Debbie’s approach to her future, but she wants 
the law to help her keep her options open. One gets a sense of her uneasy 
relationship with her future when she writes in her autobiography: ‘I 
want to know where I stand, so I don’t have to decide now about what 
may happen in the future’ (2010: 280). 
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 The desire for ontological security is also evident in Debbie’s 
recounting of her life story for the media and the subsequent publication 
of her autobiography. These can be theorised as a way of trying to 
establish narrative control over the events of her life. The construction 
of such narratives creates the ‘necessary illusions’ by which people 
imagine that their actions and words make a difference in determining 
the shape of their lives (Jackson 2002: 14). In Debbie’s own words, her 
legal battle has given, and continues to give, her life purpose, now that 
she has become a recognisable public figure who is called upon to 
comment on other right-to-die cases that make the headlines. The 
‘clarity’ she wanted to bring to the law has actually brought clarity to 
her own biographical narrative, particularly her biography-in-illness, at 
a time when the progression of her MS was depriving her of bodily and 
ontological security. Her high-profile litigation and the media spectacle 
which surrounded it has also given her dying (when it eventually 
happens) an extraordinary aesthetic. It could be argued that it is in the 
media that Debbie’s protracted dying has been recognised in its 
specificity, not in the court with its focus on the ‘technocratic 
rationalities of law’ (Riles 2006: 59) and where the specificities of each 
case must be downplayed in order to give precedence to general 
principles of law (Good 2008: S50–51). It is the media which 
challenges the so-called public absence of death (Walter et al. 1995) by 
granting extensive coverage to extraordinary deaths such as Debbie’s. 
 
THE JUDGEMENT 
 
Debbie Purdy and Omar Puente’s request for clarification from the DPP 
was refused at the Judicial Review in June 2008 and at the Appeal 
hearing (which I observed) in February 2009. However, in July 2009, 
five Law Lords in the House of Lords, the highest court in the UK,9 
ruled unanimously in the couple’s favour and ordered the DPP to 
produce a crime-specific policy identifying the factors he was likely to 
take into account in deciding whether or not to consent to prosecuting 
a suicide assistor. Debbie and Omar appeared jubilant outside the House 
of Lords on the day of the verdict. Standing alongside their lawyers and 
the Chief Executive of Dignity in Dying, Debbie and Omar smiled and 
kissed each other affectionately for the assembled press photographers. 
The legal ruling was the leading story on every TV news channel, and 
the couple appeared on the front cover of every newspaper in the 
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country. Headlines focused on Debbie’s point, which I cited earlier, that 
she was not demanding a ‘right-to-die’ so much as a ‘right-to-live-
longer’: ‘This has given me my life back’;10 ‘I feel like I have my life 
back’ – Right-to-die victory for Purdy;11 and ‘We’ve got our lives back’ 
– Debbie Purdy Triumphant’.12 The five Law Lords determined, in the 
end, that the law needed to give citizens clarity, and that, in this 
instance, clarity was unjustifiably lacking. Their sympathies clearly 
rested with Debbie and Omar: ‘It cannot be doubted that a sensible and 
clear policy document would be of great legal and practical value, as 
well as being … of some moral and emotional comfort to Ms Purdy and 
others in a similar tragic situation’ (Lord Neuberger para 101). 
 The recognition shown here for the law’s role in giving ‘moral and 
emotional comfort’ seems to contradict the usual association of the law 
with dispassionate, objective rationality. Nussbaum (2004: 5, 54) 
argues that while some would like to regard the law as entirely separate 
from emotions, in reality it ubiquitously takes account of people’s 
emotional states, and the judge’s (or jury’s) compassion is constantly 
solicited. In statements such as this, the judges formally acknowledged 
Debbie’s suffering and recognised the law’s role in offering her some 
certainty over the legality or otherwise of possible future actions. 
 Following the Law Lords’ final decision, in September 2009, the 
DPP produced his ‘interim guidance’, 13  accompanied by a call for 
public participation in a 12-week consultation exercise. In the interim 
guidance, the DPP stated that factors against a prosecution included: the 
‘victim had a clear, settled, and informed wish to commit suicide’; the 
‘victim had: a terminal illness; a severe and incurable physical 
disability; or a severe degenerative physical condition’; and the person 
suspected of assisting in the suicide was a ‘spouse, partner, or a close 
personal friend’ who was ‘wholly motivated by compassion’. He made 
no reference to assistance being received from a medical professional. 
 Nearly 5000 responses were received from the public and the 
DPP’s final ‘Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging 
or Assisting Suicide’ was published in February 2010. Issues raised by 
respondents in the public consultation resulted in a fundamental shift of 
emphasis from the interim policy. Most significantly, all mention of the 
physical condition of the person being assisted to die was removed. The 
relationship between the assistor and the person being assisted was also 
removed. An important added factor which tended in favour of 
prosecution was whether the assistor was a medical doctor, nurse or 
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other healthcare provider. These changes are all significant in terms of 
how they relate more broadly to some of the central conflicts within the 
assisted suicide debate. Before I move to discuss these conflicts, it 
should be noted that the existence of a policy of this nature is seen as 
moving the UK a step closer to effectively decriminalising a non-
medicalised form of assisted suicide. It removes the risk of prosecution, 
albeit within carefully defined parameters, for those assisting loved 
ones to die both at Dignitas and in the UK. Figures released 18 months 
after the publication of the policy showed that 30 suspected assistors 
had not been prosecuted (O’Dowd 2011). However, the policy has not 
quelled the concerns or intense lobbying efforts of either proponents or 
opponents of assisted suicide. While proponents continue to fight for a 
formal legal right to a medically hastened death, the most recent 
manifestation of which is Lord Faulkner’s Assisted Dying Bill 2014-
2015, opponents continue to demand that the lives of those with a 
terminal illness or a severe, degenerative or, incurable physical 
disability are protected. 
 
THE POLICY – ASSISTED SUICIDE DE-MEDICALISED AND 
DECRIMINALISED? 
 
The removal from the policy document of any mention of the physical 
condition of the person who had taken or attempted to take their own 
life was a significant victory for those who oppose a change in the law 
on assisted dying. Their concern centred on the idea that positing a 
physical condition as a ‘reasonable’ motive for a person wanting to take 
their own life effectively sent a powerful symbolic statement that life 
with such a physical disability, whether terminal or severe and 
incurable, is of a lower quality. By identifying a certain category of 
person in this way, it is argued that an implicit judgement is made about 
whole groups of people who are living with severe and incurable illness 
and disability. As Asch (2001: 302) writes, the cultural emphasis on 
self-sufficiency leads people to doubt that anyone who cannot execute 
‘normal’ life tasks like eating, walking or managing personal hygiene 
could enjoy life as much as someone who performs these tasks without 
assistance. 
 This is what the Italian philosopher Agamben (1998) called ‘bare 
life’: a human life that is left exposed to death when it becomes 
separated from its normal political status and the protection of the law. 
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Lock’s (2002) analysis of organ transplantation in Japan and the USA 
drew attention to the way in which the law creates certain categories of 
persons in order to facilitate certain outcomes; in her example, the 
category of the ‘brain dead’ in order to facilitate the harvesting of 
organs. To stipulate in a policy document certain categories of ill or 
disabled persons who would 1) be more likely to want to commit 
suicide and 2) whose assistors would be less likely to be held criminally 
accountable, would not just facilitate an outcome of leniency to people 
in Omar’s situation but would also, according to opponents’ arguments, 
send a strong message that certain categories of persons were less 
worthy of protection by the state. This would likely exacerbate the fears 
of those currently living with severe illness and disability who had no 
desire whatsoever to hasten their own death. 
 An alternative view is that certain physical conditions, specifically 
terminal or degenerative diseases, can result in bodily and existential 
suffering, the experience and continuation of which some people can 
feel is ‘unbearable’ to them. To be officially diagnosed with a known 
illness which has severe symptoms is recognised by the majority of 
people (if social attitudes polling is accurate) as being a reason someone 
might want to hasten their death. Hausmann’s (2004) discourse analysis 
of press coverage of assisted dying found that illness was nearly always 
seen as a decisive factor in justifying a sympathetic response to assisting 
someone’s suicide: ‘Whereas this sympathy cannot be openly expressed 
by stating categorically that “serious illness is enough to justify the 
killing of people”, it can be argued that this same sentiment is expressed 
more subtly by making extensive reference to the poor health of the 
patient’ (Hausmann 2004: 215). 
 Indeed, a medical diagnosis is a fundamental requirement made of 
those wishing to die at Dignitas. This is because it is seen to legitimise 
someone’s request to die. However, there is an important qualifier 
which those advocating for a right-to-die say undermines opponents’ 
arguments that whole categories of persons are assumed to be living 
‘potentially worthless lives’ (Greasley 2010: 324). This qualifier is that 
the medical diagnosis and the statement that a person is ‘suffering 
unbearably’ are necessary but not sufficient conditions for warranting 
help to die. What is of overriding concern is that a ‘considered and 
persistent request’14 is made by individuals themselves. To those who 
support a change of the law, the need for a voluntary request 
demonstrates that to legalise hastened death would not result in whole 
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categories of persons being implicitly judged, but would instead show 
respect for the autonomy of someone who, by their own subjective 
determination, had judged their own suffering to be ‘unbearable’. 
 Here we return to the thorny issue of autonomy. As already 
described in this chapter, the inter-subjective aspect of people’s end-of-
life decisions is often obscured by right-to-die rhetoric and its focus on 
individual autonomy. Debbie may see her death decision as hers alone 
to make, but how she experiences her suffering on a daily basis is 
dependent on the care and support she receives from Omar. Biggs 
(1998) has interrogated this inter-subjective/inter-corporeal aspect from 
a feminist perspective. She argues that it is no surprise that the loudest 
voices demanding legal reform belong to women like Dianne and 
Debbie. She relates this to the gendered nature of care in society as a 
whole (Young and Cullen 1996), and the fact that women’s perceptions 
and tolerances of their own illnesses and infirmities are inescapably 
coloured by their role as carer. Many women feel concerned at the 
prospect of becoming the cared-for rather than the carer, and this makes 
them feel particularly vulnerable (Biggs 1998: 294). Similarly, Arber et 
al. (2008) found that older women were twice as likely as older men to 
refuse life-prolonging medical technologies, which they attributed to 
women’s greater life course involvement in caring and empathising 
with the wishes and concerns of others. 
 It is such inter-subjective evaluative judgements which made the 
DPP’s job of producing a codified response very difficult. In trying to 
write a policy document which was not encumbered by the rhetoric of 
either ‘side’ in the debate, the DPP decided, on balance, to omit all 
reference to the physical condition of the person taking their own life. 
He tried to depoliticise the policy-making process while the 
campaigners tried to use it as a forum for political action. As a result of 
his attempts to defuse tensions and limit the scope of his policy, the 
DPP now has a document that emphasises the compassionate 
motivation of the assistor, but makes no mention of the motivation of 
the person who wants to take their own life. Some have argued that ‘this 
makes the basis upon which the assistor is expected to feel compassion 
rather unfathomable’ (Biggs 2011: 86). 
 The second ‘factor’ which appeared in the DPP’s interim guidance 
and disappeared in the final policy was that of the relationship between 
the person taking their own life and the person helping them. Being a 
spouse, partner or a close friend of the person requesting help was not 
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included as a mitigating factor in the final version of the policy, due to 
the fact that some relatives might be manipulative. However, while the 
DPP may have been persuaded that this was not a relevant factor, the 
media coverage of Debbie and Omar’s case suggests that it was deemed 
to be relevant by journalists and by the wider public. Their relationship 
also seemed to be of significance to the judges in the Court of Appeal 
who described Omar’s potential assistance with her suicide as a ‘final 
act of devotion’ and ‘the culmination of a lifelong loving relationship’ 
motivated by ‘raw compassion and devoted love’ (Para 7,10). In the 
final House of Lords ruling, their relationship continued to be viewed 
as significant: ‘the difficult and tragic cases where a loving relative 
assists a person’ (Lord Neuberger, para 97). And later: ‘the offender 
will often be a relatively reluctant participator, and will often be 
motivated solely by love and/or sympathy’ (Lord Neuberger, para 102). 
 The involvement of relatives or ‘compassionate friends’ in 
techniques of hastening death is a form of de-medicalised assisted 
suicide. For many commentators, modern death became over-
medicalised in the twentieth century. Illich (1977) was possibly the 
most scathing critic, declaring the medical profession to be a ‘disabling 
profession’ destroying our will to self-care. Howarth and Leaman 
(2001: 411) refer to de-medicalisation as ‘the point at which the 
medicalisation of social life is turned back, or reversed.’ For Ost (2010), 
the involvement of relatives in assisted suicides might result in a better 
death than were it to be a wholly medicalised procedure. Ost gives the 
following reasons for this: that a less medicalised and less clinical 
procedure would produce ‘a less tense affair’; that it might reassure the 
person concerned that their relatives approve of their decision; and that 
they will benefit from the emotional support that their relatives provide 
(2010: 507). It is clear from her reasoning that Ost, like Lord Neuberger, 
assumes the involvement of a beneficent spouse or relative, which the 
DPP decided was not an assumption which was likely to reassure the 
public or properly safeguard ‘vulnerable’ individuals. As one lawyer I 
interviewed said, ‘There is often a misconception that families actually 
like each other.’ 
 The third factor which was not part of the DPP’s interim guidance 
but featured in the final policy and which tended in favour of 
prosecution was if the assistor was ‘acting in his or her capacity as a 
medical doctor, nurse, or other healthcare professional’. Again, this 
points to the ‘de-medicalised’ notion of assistance to which the policy 
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relates. Medicalised forms of assisted dying inspire three predominant 
fears among those who oppose any change in the law. The first of these 
fears relates to what is generally known as the ‘slippery slope’ (or what 
philosophers term ‘consequentialist’ arguments), which is the idea that 
once the principle of intentional killing has been revoked, there can be 
no future principled opposition to an extension of the law to incorporate 
other categories of persons who may reasonably be entitled to enlist 
help to die. The second fear is that hidden pressures will come to be 
applied to elderly, frail or otherwise ‘vulnerable’ people who may be 
made to feel a ‘burden’ by others, particularly their relatives, and so 
avail themselves of the law to satisfy others. Thirdly, there is a fear that 
legalising medical assistance to die would result in an irreversible 
change in the medical profession’s ethics and code of practice. For all 
of these reasons, there continues to be vociferous opposition from a 
number of parties (not all religious) to a medicalised form of assisted 
death. The majority of British doctors, for example, do not support 
assisted suicide, opposition being particularly strong among palliative 
medicine specialists (Seale 2009). The DPP’s inclusion of a list of 
healthcare professionals in his ‘reasons in favour of prosecution’ 
showed his desire to differentiate a version of non-medicalised assisted 
death, which encompasses those travelling to Dignitas, now effectively 
decriminalised, from medically assisted death which remains illegal. In 
2014, the new DPP amended the policy yet again. This time it was to 
clarify that healthcare professionals would only face a greater chance 
than others of being prosecuted if it was shown they had a duty of 
professional care to the ‘victim’, rather than the fact of their 
professional identity per se. For example, family carers who happen to 
be healthcare professionals but who want to assisted a loved one to die 
are not exposed to greater risk of prosecution, neither are retired British 
doctors who write medical reports for people applying to die with Swiss 
right-to-die organisations. 
 The central paradox of the assisted suicide debate is that while on 
the one hand advocates reject the professionalisation and over-
medicalisation of dying and advocate giving ‘choice’ to patients about 
how and when they want to die, on the other hand they are demanding 
a medicalised form of assisted suicide whereby it is doctors who would 
decide who qualifies under any act of parliament and doctors who 
would supervise the process. A palliative care physician told me that 
campaigners’ insistence on an entitlement or ‘right’ to a hastened death 
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assumes that this ‘translates into some kind of obligation for other 
people to do it … which is bizarre!’ Certainly there are some pro-
campaigners who would like to follow the Swiss model and take the 
procedure out of the hands of doctors entirely. However, the more 
mainstream pro-lobbyists would prefer to retain the involvement of the 
medical profession. One of the most obvious reasons for this is that they 
are the main gatekeepers of the medications which are required (Lewis 
2007: 130). Another reason, I would argue, is that doctors’ involvement 
imbues that decision or that act with greater legitimacy than receiving 
help from a relative, friend or Dignitas volunteer. Assisted dying 
campaigners like Debbie Purdy seem caught up in both rejecting 
professional determination over their lives and wanting the legitimacy 
that an official medical diagnosis or legal judgement brings. 
Professionals have a special position in the political economy and 
however society may try to rationalise their services, professional 
ideology is suffused with a ‘transcendent value’ (Friedson 2001: 122) 
that people want conferred upon their decisions. The question is 
whether giving doctors the power to decide on someone’s ‘bare life’ 
(Agamben 1998) is actually in the interests of society as a whole, or 
whether it dangerously concentrates power in the hands of one 
profession. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The ultimate conclusion to the case study I have presented here will be 
Debbie’s death. Whether she dies an ‘artificial’ death with the help of 
Dignitas, or a ‘natural’ death with or without the help of the pain-easing 
medications offered by palliative care professionals, her death 
undoubtedly will gain international media coverage and will be 
scrutinised by all of those who are invested in the debate for evidence 
of its ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’. The more immediate outcome of her case 
which has significance beyond the life of one individual has been the 
publication of a policy document which for the first time gives the 
reasons why a person might not be prosecuted for assisting someone to 
die. The existence of this policy marks a controversial shift in the social 
sanction of deliberate death in the UK. While it seems fair to assume 
that most people, regardless of whether they support assisted dying or 
not, would not want to see Debbie’s husband Omar prosecuted for 
helping her to travel to Dignitas, there is still a concern, particularly 
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among those who resist a change in the law, that the policy goes some 
way towards creating exceptions to the prohibition on killing. Those 
who, like Dianne Pretty and (possibly, at some future time) Debbie 
Purdy, might want to be classified as ‘exceptions’ to that prohibition, 
argue that the law is not protecting them but rather abandoning them to 
the vagaries of their diseases and to the suffering those diseases cause. 
For Dianne, it was as if she was being ‘made to live’ (Foucault 2003: 
241) by a state which had taken away her human rights. The law had 
failed to provide a remedy for her suffering. Defenders of the status quo, 
however, argue that if the state were to enable these women and other 
people with similarly incurable illnesses to die with the help of a doctor 
it would create a dangerous exception to the prohibition on killing and 
thereby expose people to being designated what Agamben terms ‘bare 
life’ or ‘life which ceases to have any juridical value and can, therefore, 
be killed without the commission of homicide’ (Agamben 1998: 139). 
While the DPP’s policy does not apply to so-called ‘mercy killings’, 
where the would-be helper actually takes the person’s life, this 
provision is barely enough to stem the rising fears of an opposition 
concerned about the unintended or unforeseen effects of creating such 
a legal exception. 
 In the common law system, once an exception is made, that 
exception establishes a precedent, which can then ground the logic to 
establish further exceptions: ‘the ends of one analytical practice become 
the means of the next’ (Riles 2004: 783). This can be considered the 
legal ‘slippery slope’ which so concerns those campaigning against a 
change in the law. Two successive legal challenges have since been 
brought in order to apply further pressure on the law and exploit the 
exceptions exposed by Debbie Purdy’s successful appeal: that of Tony 
Nicklinson 15  and a subsequent appeal brought by his widow, Jane 
Nicklinson, and two others, Paul Lamb and a man named only as 
‘Martin’ (Richards 2014). 16  Effectively, Debbie’s lawyers and the 
campaigners who instructed them used the law instrumentally to force 
the development of a key policy document which the British 
parliamentary system had not seen fit to create. The charge laid against 
this type of activism is that assisted dying is in danger of being legalised 
‘by the back door’,17 and that the judiciary is overstepping its role. 
 The ruling in Debbie Purdy’s case provided some remedy for the 
uncertainty about Omar’s possible treatment by the state following his 
journey to Switzerland and, according to Debbie, has extended her life 
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in that she no longer feels the need to travel to Switzerland before she 
is ready or before her suffering has become ‘unbearable’. However, the 
existence of the policy has not totally removed uncertainty about 
Omar’s possible prosecution or provided a remedy for the uncertainty 
about how Debbie’s disease will progress. Neither the court nor medical 
science can cure her disease, predict her future suffering or determine 
how long she will live. While the lawyers in the courtroom spent only 
a short amount of time outlining the bare facts of Debbie and Omar’s 
dilemma before moving to debate the general points of law arising from 
the case, the media obliged the couple with air time and column inches 
in order to tell the specifics of their story. Debbie’s autobiography, 
published presumably on the strength of her legal victory, gives her 
further opportunity to provide a detailed account of her life, including 
her life-in-illness and her fears about the future. Debbie is now a public 
figure, an ordinary person whose death planning or death-in-waiting has 
made for an extraordinary spectacle. Disputing Aries’s view that 
modern death ‘no longer makes a sign’ (Aries 1985: 266), Walter et al. 
(1995: 593) have argued that the mass media is where death makes its 
sign, and does so in a more public and accessible way than the medical 
discourses of death. The instrumental use of both the law and the media 
in Debbie’s case gave a platform to those trying to apply pressure on 
the government to change the law on assisted dying. Her legal victory 
and the opinions of the judges validated her account of her suffering, 
while the official written policy made public an ‘implicit legitimisation’ 
of her option to go to Dignitas (Greasley 2010: 325). Debbie’s 
successful legal case has provided further impetus to the pro-
campaigners to bring more test cases to the courts and has helped them 
to apply political pressure on the lawmakers in London. As long as 
people continue to opt for the services of Dignitas, and these journeys 
are reported in the media, the public will be reminded that there are 
certain types of suffering which lie beyond the scope of the medical 
profession to ameliorate. 
 
POSTSCRIPT 
 
In December 2014, it was widely reported in the British media that 
Debbie Purdy had died as a result of refusing food and fluid at a hospice 
in the north of England. In a ‘final article’ published in The Independent 
on Sunday in January 2015, reportedly penned by Debbie herself before 
235 
 
her death, she describes how life since 2012 had become ‘unbearable’ 
to her, following a worsening in her MS. She wrote that both she and 
Omar were concerned, despite the CPS policy, that Omar might still be 
prosecuted if he helped her to travel to Switzerland, due to the fact that 
‘Omar is black’. She therefore determined to end her own life without 
assistance, by refusing food and fluid.     
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NOTES 
1  Amended in 2009 by the Coroners and Justice Act 
2  Simon Gillespie, Chief Executive of the Multiple Sclerosis Society, in evidence to the Commission on 
Assisted Dying 23 March 2011, available online at www.commissiononassisteddying.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/04/Simon-Gillespie-Transcript.pdf 
3  This term is from the Dutch Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act 
2002 and was also used in the UK’s Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill. 
4  It is useful to mention terminological distinctions here.  Dignity in Dying draws a distinction between 
‘assisted dying’, defined as assisting a terminally ill, mentally competent adult to shorten the dying process 
at their request, and ‘assisted suicide’, where the person asking for help is chronically, but not terminally ill 
(Wooton 2010).  While this terminological distinction is not widely adhered to by those in the right-to-die 
movement, I regard it as a useful distinction to make and so have conformed to this terminology throughout 
the chapter.  
5  Section 2(1) of the Suicide Act was amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The language was 
updated from ‘aid, abet, counsel or procure the suicide of another’ to ‘encourage or assist’, but the criminal 
offence remains the same. 
6  Article 8: 1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
7  The case involved a 68 year old man with paranoid schizophrenia who had developed gangrene in a foot 
while serving a prison term. Despite being told he had only a 15% chance of survival if his lower leg was not 
amputated, the man refused the operation saying he preferred to die with two feet than to live with one. The 
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hospital questioned his capacity to exercise his autonomy in this matter, but the court held that although his 
general capacity to make decisions was impaired by his schizophrenia, he understood the ‘nature, purpose 
and effects’ of the treatment being refused and so was within his rights (Mason and Laurie 2006: 375). 
8  Ms B was paralysed from the neck down and her life was sustained only by a ventilator. She requested that 
the ventilator keeping her alive be switched off. The dilemma for the doctors was whether she had legal 
capacity to make such a decision. After conflicting psychiatric reports about her mental capacity, her case 
went to court and the judge presiding attended Ms B’s bedside to hear her story and assess her mental 
capacity in person. Ms B was found competent to make the decision and the ventilator was switched off. As 
a symbolic gesture, notional damages of £100 were awarded in recognition of the technical assault that the 
health carers had committed by continuing to treat Ms B against her wishes (Mason and Laurie 2006:377). 
9  It has now been superseded by the Supreme Court. 
10 The Daily Mail, 31 July 2009. 
11 The Guardian, 31 July 2009.  
12 The Independent, 31 July 2009. 
13 www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/as_policy.html 
14 This was the phrase used in the House of Lords Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill. 
15 In 2012, Tony Nicklinson, who was paralysed from the neck down and unable to speak following a stroke, 
sought a declaration from the courts that it would not be unlawful, on the grounds of necessity, for a doctor 
to assist in the termination of his life. Mr Nicklinson was represented by the same lawyers as Debbie Purdy, 
and, as in her case, they also appealed to Article 8 of the ECHR (respect for private life). Mr Nicklinson lost 
his case and died of pneumonia six days later after refusing food and fluids. 
16 In 2013, Jane Nicklinson (Tony Nicklinson’s widow); Paul Lamb, who is paralysed from the neck down 
following a car accident; and a man named only as ‘Martin’, who has locked-in syndrome, appealed the 
decision of the High Court in Re Nicklinson (on the application of) v Ministry Of Justice [2012]. 
17 Richard Hawkes, Chief Executive of Scope, in ‘People who assist suicide will face test of motives, says 
DPP’, The Guardian, 25 February 2010. 
